• Was attacking Iran's computers a good idea?

    From BOB KLAHN@1:123/140 to ALL on Mon Jan 17 21:47:28 2011

    Well, it's out, the worm that attacks industrial controls was,
    supposedly, developed by the US and Israel to damage Iran's nuke
    program. The former head of the Mossad said Iran's program has
    been set back maybe 4 years. Though he did not mention the worm.

    Ok is this a good idea? Last I heard the US intel agencies said
    Iran does not have a nuke weapon program. Has that changed? If
    not, why is the US believing foreign sources, and not the US
    sources?

    Why is the US taking risks like that for Israel, and Saudi
    Arabia, and other Arab, actually Sunni, countries? And the risks
    may well be greater than realized.

    I first heard of the Stuxnet worm on NPR, some weeks back. Then
    it was just speculation that Israel had developed it, low level
    speculation. The real issue was, it was turning up in industrial
    systems.

    See, the worm attacks industrial controls made by Siemans corp.
    Siemans is a German company that makes a wide variety of
    products, but is big in industrial controls. There are two
    general types of industrial controls. One is a control that is
    designed solely for industrial operations, and has little
    similarity to any computer that you would have contact with.
    That is the kind I am mostly familiar with.

    The other is a PC with softward and interfaces for industrial
    operations. It is typically run with some form of Windows.

    Now, I do not know which they are using for those centrifuges.
    If they are the PC controlers, then the worm is very likely a
    complex version of the typical computer malware. Since it was
    said to be spread through flash drives I suspect that is what
    they are dealing with.

    If it's the pure industrial type, it is unlikely the worm is in
    the controller itself, but in the computer that programs the
    controller. That would take a truly high level worm. Which may
    be why the Stuxnet is considered so complex. The programming
    computer would have an altered program it would feed into the
    controller, and that is how it would do the damage.

    Either way, once the worm is discovered, I doubt it will take
    much to alter it to attack controls for systems other than
    nuclear related.

    What would be the effect if factories all over the country, all
    over the world, suddenly started haveing breakdowns due to an
    altered version of the worm? If I were asked to create one, I
    would probably just have a time delay after it's inserted, to
    create difficulty in tracking it down. Then I might just have it
    freeze all the control outputs on at one time.

    If a machine is running, and suddenly the controls freeze up
    with the machine in motion, the results can be disasterous.
    Things don't move out of the way when they should, don't detect
    positions right, don't stop when things go wrong.

    I would freeze them on because turning them off might stop the
    machine, which could prevent or lessen the damage.

    With the PC type control the hacker has more flexibility. He can
    put in options to seek out the best way to do damage. If it's on
    the web he can even have it send back I/O info to find the best
    way to do the most damage.

    Now, this worm is out there, and not just in Iran. So, how long
    till hackers get hold of it. Wanna bet they don't already have
    it?

    And if Iran wants revenge, how many hackers can they buy for
    maybe a few million dollars? Maybe $20 Mill?

    On top of that, we have justified Chinese cyber attacks on our
    systems. We did it, why can't they? Cyberwarfare may well have
    begun, and we are the aggressors.

    Now as to the motives, that's another message.

    BOB KLAHN bob.klahn@sev.org http://home.toltbbs.com/bobklahn

    ... There is a current shortage of plowshares and a vast surplus of swords.
    --- Via Silver Xpress V4.5/P [Reg]
    * Origin: Doc's Place BBS Fido Since 1991 docsplace.tzo.com (1:123/140)